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First Semester 1970-71 
Bolling R. Pow'ell, Jr . 
QUESTION I: 
A railroad fireman ,vas seriously injured when an engine in which he was 
riding J'umped the tracko All . th hi ~ eg~ng .at s injuries ,'lere due to respondent I s 
negligence~ he brought this action for damag~s d " F d I ~ 1 Lia-~ - un er. ,_."1(3 e era ~j';lp oyers 
bility Act (45 US C Section 51 et. seq.) in an Ohio Court of Common Pleas. 
Under FEL\ the plaintiff could have brought his suit either in a United States 
District Court or in the Ohio Court of Common Pleaso FELA also accorded plain-
tiff the right of jury trial> t-lhich he demanded. 
Respondent's defenses were (1) A denial of negligence, and (2) A written 
document signed by plaintiff purporting to release the defendant in full for 
$924.63. 
In his testimony plaintiff admitted that he had siened several receipts 
for payment made him in connection with his injuries but denied that he had 
made a full and complete settlement of all his claims. He contended that the 
purported release was void because he had signed it relying on respondent's 
deliberately false statement that the document Has nothing more than a mere 
receipt. for back 'tvages. 
Under Ohio procedure factual issue. as to fraud in the execution of this 
release was a matter to be tried by the trial judge rather than by the jury. 
Under Ohio lat-7 factual issues as to negligence "lere trieble by j uryo 
Follov7ing the Ohio law as to procedure the trial judge, after both par-
ties had introduced considerable evidence and rested, submitted the issue of 
negligence and damages to the jury which returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff awarding him $25,000. The trial judge then adjudicated the factual 
issues as to fraud in the execution of the release without a jury and found 
that the plaintiff had been "guilty of supine negligence l1 in failing to read 
the release (it being established that the plaintiff could read and write), 
and accordingly held that the facts did not "sustain either in la~v or equity 
the allegations of fraud by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence." 
Th 1 . d entered J'udgment for the defendant not withstanding ereupon the tria JU ge 
the verdict of the jury. 
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The Ohio Supreme Court, one judg e d issenting, sustained the action of the 
trial judge h oldins that ~ (1) Ohio:; n o t fe de r al l2.~J, governed ~ (2) under 
Ohio 18'1:-1 the plainti f f a :r.:.an of ordinary intelligen ce ~-lho could read
9 
,vas bound 
by t he release even though ~e had b een ';nd"ce('1 t o s ';o ~' !l_ '; t ~. u - . " ~ by the celiberately 
false stateraent t h at it u as only a rec,., ';p t for b 1 ( ) 
- '-"... ac ~ ,·, ag es ; and 3 under con-
trolling Ohio procedure factual issues as to fraud in t h e execution of this 
release \-lere prope rly decided by t h e j udge rath er t h an by t he jury . 
The Su p reme Court of United States granted certioYari . 1;)hat issue 
or issues are p resented? h m J should t h e Sup r eme Cour t of t he United States 
rule thereon and for vhat reasons ? 
Petitioner , United S tates ArT2y Ser8 e ant s while on an eveni ng pass in 
August 1965 from his Army post in EaHaii and in civiliaa at t ire . b rok.e into a 
hotel room . assaulted a g irl , and attemp ted ral'e . Fol lovJi ng his arrest , Eono-
lulu police s on learning t h at petitioner u as in t h e Arned Forces , delivered 
him to the l:ilitary Pol ice. After interrogation, ? etitioner confessed. Ge 
t<1BS charged ~-lith attet!lp t ed r a pe , h ousebre aking and a ssault 1-;ith a ttempted rape 
in violation of Art . 30 ~ 130 ;1 34 o f the Uniform Cod e of ~1i litary Justice . 
tried by Court j'-~3r t i al, convicted on a l l counts and sent enced. His convic-
tion ,"as affirmed by t h e Army Bo are. o f r_evieH and t hereafte r by the United 
States Court of dilitary Av p e als. 
Petitioner l 2. t e r filed petition for w-rit o f habeas corpus in a United 
States Distric.t r'ourt cla i Tting t h a t the court-martial vlas Hithout jurisdiction 
to try him for t hese o f fenses . The District Co urt denied relief and the Court 
of Apnt:>als aff~ rme ' Ce1""tJ.·ora'-1· >-l as !2': ran ted b y t he UniteC: States Sup reme Court • • ~ J.. • u. _ .. , ~ 
-({nat issue or issues are presented and hOH s hould the Supreme Court rule 
ana for ~"lhat reasons? 
i-Irs. Sa.lly Franconi instituted suit in t h e United States District Court for 
the iJestern District of Texas against the Southern Pacific Co . for personal in-
juries sustained VJhell the automobile she was driving \ l aS struck by Southern 
Pacific Co. ' s locomotive at a crossing in Richmond g Cal . on the night of 
February 20 , 1942. 
The record discloses that two of the jurors on the panel E~es~lted to the 
plaintiff Here employees of the defendant , Souf:hern Pacific Co . A timely chal-
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lenge for cause '(-las made 1- - . th 1 ° ° f' f U j e p a~nt:l.._ g rounded upon this employnent relation-
ship. On exa~ination b y t h e court t hese t wo juro rs state~ tl~at 
_ . t h e fact that 
they were employed by Southern Pacific {;o. <,rould 
_, not in any ,vay affect their 
consideration of t h e case , that they vlOuld fully abide by their oaths as jurors 
and render an impart ial and obJoect;ve d i 
.... ver ct based <;-Jholly on the evidence intro-
duced during the course o f t p_e trl.°al . ~h h .L e cour t t ereupon denied plaintiff ' s 
challenge for cause o J: these t ':vo jurors holding t hat t h ey Here not disqualified 
by reason of their employment b y d e f endant , Southern Pacific Co. 
These t HO jurors ,-Jere then peremptorily challenged b y the plaintiff \-,ho. 
in the course of selecting the jury . exh austed all of her peremptory challenges. 
The trial proceeded~ and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the de-
fendant. 
Upon motion for a ne\'l tria l filed by plair.tiff , s h e alleged and offered to 
prove that ~ among the jurors v ho tried t h e c a se . ther e Here others that ~-1ere 
objectionable to her and upon 'whom she v!Ould have used her peremptory challenges 
if the court had not forced her to use them on the t~-70 employee s of the defendant 
Southern Pacific Co o 
In opposing t h is motio n for a neH trial the de f e ndant South ern f.:;.cific Co. 
argued tha t the trial court ';-Jas not in error i n refusing t o dismiss the t~vo 
jurors \-1ho \V-ere employ ed by Southern Pacific Co . , and. that even if this action 
of the trial court was erroneous , no harm res ulte d to the p laintiff for t he 
reason that the t,.;ro cha llenge d jurors did not sit upon t he trial and that 
plaintiff di el not attemp t to challeng e any of t h e rem;;±ining jurors who tried the 
case. 
The District Court denied plaintiff i s motion for a neH trial and plaintiff 
appealed ~ assigning as error the District Court's failure to sustain plaintiff's 
challenge for cause of the two employees of Southern Pacific Co. and the failure 
of District Court to grant a ne.<T trial on the grounds stated . 
Em<] should the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rule 
upon the issue or issues presented and for ~-7hat reasons? 
QUESTION IV : 
This is an appeal from a judgment on a directed verdict in favor of the 
appellee > I1rs. Pearl Nesta . for $10 , 000 in her suit to recover that sum on a 
policy of insurance indemnifying her against theft of jewelry and other speci-
fied chattels . The defendant denied that t he plaintiff had been robbed and de-
manded a jury trial. 
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At the trial i'Irs 0 Ilesta lvas the on_l y' 1 l~tness w~o appeared to testify. 
In her testiLlony lIrs. 'olesta stated t :1at s h e lived in a oodest thirty room house 
in the e mb assy s e ction of ;)ashing tou:; D.C. ; tha t on ThursdaY g August 7, 1969 
at about 5 0 j clod.: in the afternoon 9 as she was about to leave for a cocktail 
party at the French Erilb assy ~ she ans"ered the front door bell to her home ; it 
being the dOIllestic }lelp; s day off ; that ~vhen she opened the door s he \vas con-
fronted Hith a man ,;rith a scarf over °his face pointing a large pistol at her ; 
that the man told her to hand over 2.11 jewelry she Has ,orearing , ,o,hich she did ~ 
that t h e man turned and ran 2nd she slarur.1ed t h e door ~ irrunediately telephoning 
the police , reporting the robbery ; that the police arrived shortly thereafter 7 
questioned her a t leng th and inspected the premises for clues ~ t hat no one uas 
ever arrested for the robbery ; that she reported the r obbery to the defendant 
insurance company later that sane day and their representative called t~1e follow-
ing morning and preparec~ a jJ roof of clain itemizing each item of je~" elry taken, 
\olhich sile signed : t h at t h ree months later, on her birthday , upon returning home 
from a birthday party given in her honor by t ~1e Ambassador from Luxemburg she 
found an unmarked envelope layin~ betl;,Teen t he screen door and t h e entrance door 
to her home 10Jhi ch contained all of the stolen je1:,Telry except her dial'l.ond engage-
ment ring v!hich had bee n. appraiseJ by the insurance company at $10 sOOO "hen the 
policy ~-7as issued . She could g ive no description of the robber except that he 
was a m.edium size man uearing a cap pulled Hell dmvn over h is forehead and tvear-
ing gloves. Sll.e testified t~-:a t the scarf he wore covered his face from the 
lmoler part of his ey es down and that the cap covered his face frol'l. his eyebrmvs 
uptvard. leaving only his eyes visible. She testifieo. that his eyes appeared to 
be black or dark brou n and that his h air appeared to be black or dark brmvn. She 
stated that he had a s 1:,Tarthy comp lexion. 
The plaintiff ' s testimony was the only evidence offered at trial. The 
defendant offered no witnesses and no documentary evidence of any kind. 
The plaiontiff moved for a directed verdict \vhen the defendant stated it 
had no evidence to introduce and rested. 
The trial court g ranted plantiff ' s motion for directed verdict ruling 
that plantiffrs evidence was uncontradicted and conclusive and, hence, that 
NO b' d t th J' ry The trial court entered there was1question of fact to be su ml-tte 0 _e u . 
judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $lO~OOO. The defendant noted his 
J.·n a t{~.o ely manner to this rulin8 of the trial court. objections and exceptions ~'" 
The defendant insurance company appealed t o the Uni ted States Court of Ap-
peals for District of Columbia assigning as error the District Court's ruling 
granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict. 
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lThat issue or issues are p_ resente 1 and -no'" 1 
• w sil.ould t"'le Court of Appeals 
rule thereon? State your reasons. 
QlJESTION .Y.. ~ 
On t he night of January 17. 1967 an unmasked man commi tted a robbery in a 
liquor store operated by Louie Pizitz in He,.; York City . 
Imme,Uately after the r obbery l!r. Fizitz notified the police ,\o,ho arrived 
shortly thereafter to investi~ate the robbery and search for clues. At that 
time lIr. Pizi tz described the robber as being about six feet tall and thin vlith 
gray eyes and a suart~y complexion "'ho ".;as Hearing a large hat, a dark turtle 
neck SHeater and blue jean trousers, and ,,'ho spoke ",i th a foreign accent •. 
fir. Pizitz hTas taken to five police lineups within ti'lO ,'eeks after the 
robbery but was unable to identify anyone in the lineups as the robber of his 
liquor store. 
The defendant was indicted for the robbery of this liquor store on other 
circumstantial evidence obtained by the District Attorney. ~e plead not guilty. 
At the trial of the defendant whi c h occurred some eleven months after the 
robbery •• l1r . Pizi tz readily identified the defendant as the robber of his 
store . Counsel for the defendant introduced police records and the testimony 
of policy officers establishing that the defendant uas in three of the lineups 
l"ir. Pizi tz had vieHed vii thin tw'O vleeks after the robbery. 
Other than the identification by l1r. Pizitz at the tria.l there Here no 
other eye "vitnesses to the robbery identifying the defendant as the robber. 
HO\lever. there \las uncontradicted and ovenJhell";;i::i.6 circumstantial evidence of 
gUilt. 
During his final summation to t h e jury the prosecuting attorney assured 
the jury that : lr. Pizitz had "recognized" the defendant in the lineup and, 
that. although "he didn I t pick him out ' ; there ,,,as g ood reason for this. adding: 
?f I tvill be more than happy to tell you . ••• tvhy after this 
trial is over ." 
Counsel for the defendant promptly obj ected to and moved for a ne,': trial. 
The trial court censured the prosecuting attorney for making this improper 
remark and instructed the jury that there Has no basie for it in the evidence 
and should be disregarded by the jury in arriving at their verdict. The trial 
court , hO\vever, denied the motion for a ne,·;; trial. The prosecuting attorney 
r 
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was guilty of no other improprieties or irJproper remarks in his final 
summation. 
The jury returned a verdict against the defendant of guilty of robbery 
in the first degree and the defendant ,-Jas sentenced. The defendant ap-
pealed assigning as error the refusal of the trial court to grant a ne __ l 
trial beca~se of the remar k made by the prosecuting attorney in his final 
summation. 
m1at issue or issues are presented and hOH should the Court of Appeals 
rule thereon? State your reasons. 
END 
